Merge branch 'main' of https://github.com/taylorwilsdon/google_workspace_mcp into fastmcp_v3

# Conflicts:
#	uv.lock

core/attachment_storage.py

@@ -1,15 +1,16 @@
 """
 Temporary attachment storage for Gmail attachments.
 
-Stores attachments in ./tmp directory and provides HTTP URLs for access.
+Stores attachments to local disk and returns file paths for direct access.
 Files are automatically cleaned up after expiration (default 1 hour).
 """
 
 import base64
 import logging
+import os
 import uuid
 from pathlib import Path
-from typing import Optional, Dict
+from typing import NamedTuple, Optional, Dict
 from datetime import datetime, timedelta
 
 logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
@@ -17,9 +18,24 @@ logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
 # Default expiration: 1 hour
 DEFAULT_EXPIRATION_SECONDS = 3600
 
-# Storage directory
-STORAGE_DIR = Path("./tmp/attachments")
-STORAGE_DIR.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+# Storage directory - configurable via WORKSPACE_ATTACHMENT_DIR env var
+# Uses absolute path to avoid creating tmp/ in arbitrary working directories (see #327)
+_default_dir = str(Path.home() / ".workspace-mcp" / "attachments")
+STORAGE_DIR = (
+    Path(os.getenv("WORKSPACE_ATTACHMENT_DIR", _default_dir)).expanduser().resolve()
+)
+
+
+def _ensure_storage_dir() -> None:
+    """Create the storage directory on first use, not at import time."""
+    STORAGE_DIR.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True, mode=0o700)
+
+
+class SavedAttachment(NamedTuple):
+    """Result of saving an attachment: provides both the UUID and the absolute file path."""
+
+    file_id: str
+    path: str
 
 
 class AttachmentStorage:
@@ -34,9 +50,9 @@ class AttachmentStorage:
         base64_data: str,
         filename: Optional[str] = None,
         mime_type: Optional[str] = None,
-    ) -> str:
+    ) -> SavedAttachment:
         """
-        Save an attachment and return a unique file ID.
+        Save an attachment to local disk.
 
         Args:
             base64_data: Base64-encoded attachment data
@@ -44,9 +60,11 @@ class AttachmentStorage:
             mime_type: MIME type (optional)
 
         Returns:
-            Unique file ID (UUID string)
+            SavedAttachment with file_id (UUID) and path (absolute file path)
         """
-        # Generate unique file ID
+        _ensure_storage_dir()
+
+        # Generate unique file ID for metadata tracking
         file_id = str(uuid.uuid4())
 
         # Decode base64 data
@@ -73,15 +91,39 @@ class AttachmentStorage:
             }
             extension = mime_to_ext.get(mime_type, "")
 
-        # Save file
-        file_path = STORAGE_DIR / f"{file_id}{extension}"
+        # Use original filename if available, with UUID suffix for uniqueness
+        if filename:
+            stem = Path(filename).stem
+            ext = Path(filename).suffix
+            save_name = f"{stem}_{file_id[:8]}{ext}"
+        else:
+            save_name = f"{file_id}{extension}"
+
+        # Save file with restrictive permissions (sensitive email/drive content)
+        file_path = STORAGE_DIR / save_name
         try:
-            file_path.write_bytes(file_bytes)
+            fd = os.open(file_path, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_TRUNC, 0o600)
+            try:
+                total_written = 0
+                data_len = len(file_bytes)
+                while total_written < data_len:
+                    written = os.write(fd, file_bytes[total_written:])
+                    if written == 0:
+                        raise OSError(
+                            "os.write returned 0 bytes; could not write attachment data"
+                        )
+                    total_written += written
+            finally:
+                os.close(fd)
             logger.info(
-                f"Saved attachment {file_id} ({len(file_bytes)} bytes) to {file_path}"
+                f"Saved attachment file_id={file_id} filename={filename or save_name} "
+                f"({len(file_bytes)} bytes) to {file_path}"
             )
         except Exception as e:
-            logger.error(f"Failed to save attachment to {file_path}: {e}")
+            logger.error(
+                f"Failed to save attachment file_id={file_id} "
+                f"filename={filename or save_name} to {file_path}: {e}"
+            )
             raise
 
         # Store metadata
@@ -95,7 +137,7 @@ class AttachmentStorage:
             "expires_at": expires_at,
         }
 
-        return file_id
+        return SavedAttachment(file_id=file_id, path=str(file_path))
 
     def get_attachment_path(self, file_id: str) -> Optional[Path]:
         """
@@ -204,7 +246,6 @@ def get_attachment_url(file_id: str) -> str:
     Returns:
         Full URL to access the attachment
     """
-    import os
     from core.config import WORKSPACE_MCP_PORT, WORKSPACE_MCP_BASE_URI
 
     # Use external URL if set (for reverse proxy scenarios)

core/comments.py

@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ async def _read_comments_impl(service, app_name: str, file_id: str) -> str:
         service.comments()
         .list(
             fileId=file_id,
-            fields="comments(id,content,author,createdTime,modifiedTime,resolved,replies(content,author,id,createdTime,modifiedTime))",
+            fields="comments(id,content,author,createdTime,modifiedTime,resolved,quotedFileContent,replies(content,author,id,createdTime,modifiedTime))",
         )
         .execute
     )
@@ -215,9 +215,13 @@ async def _read_comments_impl(service, app_name: str, file_id: str) -> str:
         comment_id = comment.get("id", "")
         status = " [RESOLVED]" if resolved else ""
 
+        quoted_text = comment.get("quotedFileContent", {}).get("value", "")
+
         output.append(f"Comment ID: {comment_id}")
         output.append(f"Author: {author}")
         output.append(f"Created: {created}{status}")
+        if quoted_text:
+            output.append(f"Quoted text: {quoted_text}")
         output.append(f"Content: {content}")
 
         # Add replies if any

core/tool_tiers.yaml

@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ drive:
     - get_drive_file_content
     - get_drive_file_download_url
     - create_drive_file
+    - create_drive_folder
     - import_to_google_doc
     - share_drive_file
     - get_drive_shareable_link
@@ -66,6 +67,7 @@ docs:
     - list_docs_in_folder
     - insert_doc_elements
     - update_paragraph_style
+    - get_doc_as_markdown
   complete:
     - insert_doc_image
     - update_doc_headers_footers
@@ -99,8 +101,10 @@ chat:
     - send_message
     - get_messages
     - search_messages
+    - create_reaction
   extended:
     - list_spaces
+    - download_chat_attachment
   complete: []
 
 forms:

core/utils.py

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import ssl
 import asyncio
 import functools
 
+from pathlib import Path
 from typing import List, Optional
 
 from googleapiclient.errors import HttpError
@@ -29,6 +30,135 @@ class UserInputError(Exception):
     pass
 
 
+# Directories from which local file reads are allowed.
+# The user's home directory is the default safe base.
+# Override via ALLOWED_FILE_DIRS env var (os.pathsep-separated paths).
+_ALLOWED_FILE_DIRS_ENV = "ALLOWED_FILE_DIRS"
+
+
+def _get_allowed_file_dirs() -> list[Path]:
+    """Return the list of directories from which local file access is permitted."""
+    env_val = os.environ.get(_ALLOWED_FILE_DIRS_ENV)
+    if env_val:
+        return [
+            Path(p).expanduser().resolve()
+            for p in env_val.split(os.pathsep)
+            if p.strip()
+        ]
+    home = Path.home()
+    return [home] if home else []
+
+
+def validate_file_path(file_path: str) -> Path:
+    """
+    Validate that a file path is safe to read from the server filesystem.
+
+    Resolves the path canonically (following symlinks), then verifies it falls
+    within one of the allowed base directories. Rejects paths to sensitive
+    system locations regardless of allowlist.
+
+    Args:
+        file_path: The raw file path string to validate.
+
+    Returns:
+        Path: The resolved, validated Path object.
+
+    Raises:
+        ValueError: If the path is outside allowed directories or targets
+                    a sensitive location.
+    """
+    resolved = Path(file_path).resolve()
+
+    if not resolved.exists():
+        raise FileNotFoundError(f"Path does not exist: {resolved}")
+
+    # Block sensitive file patterns regardless of allowlist
+    resolved_str = str(resolved)
+    file_name = resolved.name.lower()
+
+    # Block .env files and variants (.env, .env.local, .env.production, etc.)
+    if file_name == ".env" or file_name.startswith(".env."):
+        raise ValueError(
+            f"Access to '{resolved_str}' is not allowed: "
+            ".env files may contain secrets and cannot be read, uploaded, or attached."
+        )
+
+    # Block well-known sensitive system paths (including macOS /private variants)
+    sensitive_prefixes = (
+        "/proc",
+        "/sys",
+        "/dev",
+        "/etc/shadow",
+        "/etc/passwd",
+        "/private/etc/shadow",
+        "/private/etc/passwd",
+    )
+    for prefix in sensitive_prefixes:
+        if resolved_str == prefix or resolved_str.startswith(prefix + "/"):
+            raise ValueError(
+                f"Access to '{resolved_str}' is not allowed: "
+                "path is in a restricted system location."
+            )
+
+    # Block sensitive directories that commonly contain credentials/keys
+    sensitive_dirs = (
+        ".ssh",
+        ".aws",
+        ".kube",
+        ".gnupg",
+        ".config/gcloud",
+    )
+    for sensitive_dir in sensitive_dirs:
+        home = Path.home()
+        blocked = home / sensitive_dir
+        if resolved == blocked or str(resolved).startswith(str(blocked) + "/"):
+            raise ValueError(
+                f"Access to '{resolved_str}' is not allowed: "
+                "path is in a directory that commonly contains secrets or credentials."
+            )
+
+    # Block other credential/secret file patterns
+    sensitive_names = {
+        ".credentials",
+        ".credentials.json",
+        "credentials.json",
+        "client_secret.json",
+        "client_secrets.json",
+        "service_account.json",
+        "service-account.json",
+        ".npmrc",
+        ".pypirc",
+        ".netrc",
+        ".git-credentials",
+        ".docker/config.json",
+    }
+    if file_name in sensitive_names:
+        raise ValueError(
+            f"Access to '{resolved_str}' is not allowed: "
+            "this file commonly contains secrets or credentials."
+        )
+
+    allowed_dirs = _get_allowed_file_dirs()
+    if not allowed_dirs:
+        raise ValueError(
+            "No allowed file directories configured. "
+            "Set the ALLOWED_FILE_DIRS environment variable or ensure a home directory exists."
+        )
+
+    for allowed in allowed_dirs:
+        try:
+            resolved.relative_to(allowed)
+            return resolved
+        except ValueError:
+            continue
+
+    raise ValueError(
+        f"Access to '{resolved_str}' is not allowed: "
+        f"path is outside permitted directories ({', '.join(str(d) for d in allowed_dirs)}). "
+        "Set ALLOWED_FILE_DIRS to adjust."
+    )
+
+
 def check_credentials_directory_permissions(credentials_dir: str = None) -> None:
     """
     Check if the service has appropriate permissions to create and write to the .credentials directory.